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ABSTRACT This article outlines the modern historical evolution of the Swiss political system
and describes the main features of its contemporary federalism. In particular, it focuses on
how the division of competences and the distribution of power have changed over time, on
the factors which have driven these changes, leading to a description of the current situation
created by these developments. It then compares the Swiss experience with that of the
European Union and draws some lessons from this for the debate on the evolution of the
European Union and, in particular, on the adoption and the ratification of the Constitutional
Treaty. Although it emphasizes the role of historical experiences and of political culture in
shaping Swiss federalism and the difficulties, if not the impossibility, of replicating them in
the European context, it concludes that the EU could learn from Switzerland but may not do so.
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Introduction
Switzerland as a federal state is a relatively recent creation, dating only from 1848, but
it has a long confederal history stretching back to the fourteenth century and even, if
one believes the official rhetoric, to 1291.1 It is thus seen as the country which more
than any other embodies the spirit of the federal idea. Naturally, all those interested
in the federal idea and how it can be put into practice look to Switzerland in search
of inspiration. This is even more true in the case of those regarding Switzerland as
an example of a successful federal state rooted in a pluri-cultural, if not pluri-national,
society. Students and observers of the process of European integration and especially of
its ‘end-state’ – often debated in relation to the federal model – figure prominently
among the latter.2 In this article, we follow this tradition, describing the historical evol-
ution and the present reality of Swiss federalism and presenting an interpretation of the
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forces that have shaped it over time and which sustain it today, with a view to drawing
lessons for the debate on the European Union.
The first section outlines the institutional evolution of the Swiss political system in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, emphasizing how and why it moved through a
series of phases. The next section describes the essential features of today’s Swiss fed-
eralism, in particular the division of competences and relationship between the three
levels of government. The following section compares the Swiss experience with the
evolution of the EU and discusses the extent to which the comparison between
Switzerland and the EU sharpens our understanding of the dynamics at play in the
latter. The concluding section draws some lessons for the debate on the adoption
and the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty.
The Institutional Evolution of the Swiss System
From the fourteenth century until 1848, Switzerland became a progressively tighter
confederation of small states or cantons.3 This slow evolution from looser to tighter
confederation was interrupted between 1798 and 1815 when the country was
invaded and de facto ruled by revolutionary France, which imposed first a unitary
state under the name of the Helvetic Republic and later a partial return to a confederal
structure.4 Although this period is often overlooked in accounts of Swiss political
history because it is seen as an alien imposition that was immediately rejected by
the Swiss, it actually had a lasting effect on Switzerland’s political system. The
origins of two of Switzerland’s peculiar features, the referendum and the ‘directorial’
form of executive bodies, can be traced back to this period.5 After the fall of Napoleon
the Swiss cantons regained their sovereignty and, via the Federal Treaty of 7 August
1815, re-established a confederation among themselves, albeit on a tighter and more
democratic basis than before 1798. This latter form of confederation lasted until
1847–48 when, following a brief civil war, it was replaced by the modern federal
state. The institutional structure set up by the first federal constitution in 1848 has
remained largely unaltered ever since, despite major constitutional revisions in 1874
and 1999. As discussed in the next section, however, the distribution of competences
and power between the cantonal and federal levels has changed considerably.
Two periods in Swiss political history are particularly relevant for our purpose of
comparing the European Union to the Swiss experience. The first one is the last con-
federal phase, between 1815 and 1847. In this period, the confederation reached insti-
tutional ‘maturity’ with a more sophisticated institutional structure and wider policy-
making remit than had been the case before 1798. The second period is that of the
modern federal state post-1848, especially the formative half-century after its establish-
ment. The confederal phase lends itself to a comparison with the existing EU, on the
basis of the assumption that the European Union of today is essentially a confederal
political system subject to a number of pressures to become a federal state and, at
the same time, facing very powerful resistances to moving down such a path.6 The
experience of Switzerland as a federal state is useful as a point of comparison when
considering what might occur if the EU were to become a federal state. The remainder
of this section outlines the institutional structure and the political dynamics in the two
periods mentioned above.
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The Last Confederation: 1815–47
The last phase of the Swiss confederation was the most institutionally elaborate and
mature form of confederation in Swiss history. Despite being an explicit attempt to
‘restore’ the pre-1798 order, the 1815 Treaty did accept a number of innovations
brought about by the French hegemony, chief among them being equal status for all
territories as cantons, including those which had semi-colonial status prior to 1798.
The confederation was thus a union of 217 small sovereign states – cantons –
coming together to, in the words of Article 1 of the 1815 Federal Treaty, ‘defend
their freedom and independence from any foreign attack as well as preserving internal
order and peace’ (Ko¨lz, 1992–96: 193). The cantons were independent and sovereign
states de jure and, to a large extent, de facto although some encroachment on their
sovereignty was already visible despite the essentially confederal nature of the
system. This same Article 1 revealingly stipulated that cantonal constitutions were
adopted by the supreme authority of each canton but also that they had to ‘conform
to the principles of the federal treaty’, which implied that the relationship between
the cantonal constitutions and the Federal Treaty was not dissimilar to the relationship
existing in the EU between the state constitutions and the EU treaty.8
The institutional structure of the Confederation, which was centred on a Diet made
up of representatives of each canton, was much less complex than that of either con-
temporary Switzerland or today’s EU. Cantons were on an equal footing with each
other, each having one vote regardless of the size of their population or their contri-
bution to the confederal treasury.9 Cantonal representatives to the Diet were delegates
of their respective cantonal governments and voted upon the latter’s instructions. The
Diet normally met annually, in July, in the capital of the so-called ‘managing canton’
(Vorort) whose own chief magistrate would be in the chair. When the Diet was not
sitting, the general administration of the Confederation was entrusted, on a rotating
biennial basis, to one of the ‘managing cantons’, whether Zurich, Berne or Lucerne.
The managing canton would also host the skeletal confederal administration – the con-
federal chancellery – appointed by the Diet. The Diet normally voted on the basis of a
simple majority, with the exception of very important decisions – such as military
matters – for which a three-quarters ‘qualified majority’ was required.
In the tradition of previous confederations, this last one was also primarily concerned
with defence and security, both external and internal. At the heart of the Confederation
was a mutual-defence guarantee set out in Article 4 of the Federal Treaty. As there was
no standing confederal army, the defence of the confederation was provided by the can-
tonal contingents directed in time of war by a confederal commander as general.
However, the Confederation was also concerned with economic matters. It notably
had the significant responsibilities of conducting external trade policy and signing com-
mercial treaties. The Confederation also set a common external tariff that was collected
by the border cantons and paid into the confederal treasury annually. This external
revenue was the only independent source of income for the Confederation, which
had for the rest to rely on cantonal contributions, although a ‘national’ debt accruing
to the Confederation was recognized.
Even at this stage, the constitutional framework of the Confederation placed signifi-
cant constraints on the autonomy, if not the sovereignty, of the cantons. In addition to
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the constitutional ‘compatibility clause’ already mentioned, the Treaty also prevented
cantons from concluding alliances with each other or agreements with foreign states
that were deemed to be in conflict with its norms or were detrimental to the rights of
the other cantons. On the other hand, despite the emphasis on equality symbolized
by the elevation of all territories to a cantonal status as declared in Art. 7, there
were no provisions for confederal citizenship, with the result that citizens had rights
only within their own canton and were considered ‘foreigners’ in all other cantons.
Moreover, if the balance of power between the central level and the cantons might
appear to have been rather unfavourable to the latter for a confederal order, the lack
of enforcement power on the part of the central level meant that the cantons often
ignored the Diet’s decisions (Aubert, 1974: 18).
To conclude this briefest of outlines of the institutional structure of the last Swiss
confederation, it is important to stress that cantons which signed the Federal Treaty
in August 1815 could plausibly be described as sovereign states but not as nation
states in the contemporary sense of the term. This is because, even if they were deter-
mined to defend their autonomy vis-a`-vis encroachment from the centre, they accepted
that a sense of Swiss national identity was already present, partly as a result of the
impact of French revolutionary ideas and the experience of the Helvetic Republic.
This sense of Swiss nationhood was explicitly mentioned in the last article of the
Treaty, which made reference to the ‘common fatherland’ of the cantons and was
also revealed by the proliferation of ‘national’ associations in the 1810s and 1820s
(Ko¨lz, 1992–96: 202; Aubert, 1974: 19).
From Confederation to Federation
The confederation established by the 1815 Federal Treaty was an explicit attempt to go
back in time to the old ways of the Swiss tradition and to forget as much as possible of
the revolutionary period. However, the forces unleashed by the revolution could not be
kept at bay, and they put increased pressure on the institutional structure of the last con-
federation as it entered the 1830s and 1840s. Most of these forces were part of the
broader ‘liberal movement’ sweeping Europe from which Switzerland could not
isolate itself. Moreover, the Europe-wide battle between liberal and radical forces on
one side and conservative and reactionary ones on the other also led to Switzerland’s
becoming an object of external pressure, particularly from Austria and France.
Politically, the rise of the liberal movement generated strong demands for greater
equality, more citizen participation, clearer limits on government and, especially,
more competences for the central level and a stronger institutional infrastructure to
carry them out. From about 1830 onwards, this movement led to wide-ranging consti-
tutional reforms in a number of ‘progressive’ cantons, which adopted new constitutions
that they submitted to popular approval in a referendum (Aubert, 1974: 20).10 If in
some cantons these reforms were achieved more or less peacefully, in others this
was not so. In some extreme cases the confrontation between liberal and conservative
forces led to bloodshed: in canton Basle it even led to the secession of the countryside
to form a new half-canton, Basle Country, in 1833.11 Moreover, this atmosphere of
confrontation generated inter-cantonal defensive pacts on both sides which would
spell trouble for the future.
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Economically, the liberal movement manifested itself in growing demands for the
creation of a unified economic space from which economic growth would greatly
benefit. Under the 1815 treaty, there still existed a variety of weights, measures and
currencies in Switzerland, and cross-cantonal trade was subject to tariffs and duties.
Bourgeois reformers in the rapidly industrializing cantons such as Zurich came to
see this economic fragmentation as one of the greatest obstacles to the nation’s
progress. Hence, they added their weight to the pressures for a centralization of the
system (Fahrni, 2003: 63–76; Lister, 2001: 111).
The reform movement inevitably spilled over – or, more accurately, up – from the
cantonal to the confederal level, with the liberal and radical members of the Diet exer-
cising pressure on their conservative counterparts for a reform of the Federal Treaty in
a more centralist direction. A project along those lines in 1832–33 failed to achieve
consensus, with the progressive cantons finding it too timid and the conservative
ones too radical. The failure of such moderate reforms had the effect of emboldening
the radical wing of the liberal movement, which thus intensified its campaigns for
radical democratic and federal reforms. In addition, social elements began appearing
in the campaigns. The forces of liberalism and radicalism on the one hand and of
Catholic conservatism on the other balanced each other out, with ten or so cantons
on each side, and the delicate equilibrium at the confederal level could suddenly be
altered by revolutions and counter-revolutions in some cantons, most notably that in
Lucerne, which overthrew the liberal government there in 1841. These background
trends were further exacerbated in the late 1840s by several disputes that touched on
delicate issues such as the presence of religious orders in the Catholic cantons.
In this climate, the Catholic cantons felt threatened by the mounting radical tide and
in December 1845 they signed a pact of mutual support known as the Sonderbund.
Under the terms of the Federal Treaty such pacts were illegal, hence the existence of
the Sonderbund was initially kept secret. The pact became public, however, in June
1846, triggering an immediate demand by the liberal cantons for its annulment. At
that time, however, the liberals and radicals did not constitute a majority in the Diet.
They did achieve a majority a year later, after the cantonal elections in Geneva and
St Gallen, so the Diet, meeting in July 1847, decided to dissolve the Sonderbund, to
expel the Jesuits and to revise the Treaty in a more centralist direction. These decisions
triggered a month-long civil war which ended in the defeat of the conservative, Catho-
lic cantons of central Switzerland and in the triumph of the radical forces (Remak,
1993).12
These liberal cantons set up a constitutional commission entrusted with a ‘revision’
of the Treaty, but, as it turned out, they ended up drafting a constitution for a federal
state thereby radically changing the nature of the Swiss political system. In June
1848, the new constitution was endorsed by the Diet, with 13 votes in favour and 9
against or abstaining. Subsequently, the new constitution was ratified by popular refer-
endum in all but one of the cantons, with 13 and a half votes in favour and 6 and a half
against. In September the last Diet gathered to promulgate the new constitution and
establish the new federal state, although, strictly speaking, the procedures by which
the new constitution was being adopted were illegal under the terms of the existing
Federal Treaty. The cantons defeated in the civil war voted against the new constitution
both at the Diet and in the ratification process but ultimately accepted the outcome and
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participated in the subsequent election for the new federal parliament. The new
parliament gathered for the first time in November 1848 in Berne, which was made
the permanent capital.
The 1848 Settlement
The 1848 constitution represented a compromise settlement between the vision of the
radicals and the need to keep the old Sonderbund cantons on board. It set up a federal
state in which the cantons retained ample autonomy in many areas of policy-making
under the ‘residual powers’ clause of Art. 3. In formal constitutional terms, the shift
from a confederation of states to a federal state was far from unambiguous. On the
one hand, the first article of the constitution cited as the constituting body of the
new state ‘the peoples of the twenty-two sovereign cantons’, with no mention of a
single Swiss demos. Moreover, no explicit supremacy clause of federal law over can-
tonal law was written into the constitution.13 On the other hand, the preamble made
explicit reference to the ‘unity, force and honour of the Swiss nation’ and Art. 3
clearly stated that cantons were sovereign only insofar as their sovereignty was not
specifically limited by the federal constitution.14 As had been the case in the past,
however, political practice was different from the letter of the constitution and
pointed to a clear shift of power towards the central level. Despite an initial challenge
to the legality of the new constitution by three members of the defeated Sonderbund –
Uri and the two half-cantons of Nidwald and Obwald15 – direct defiance of the prin-
ciple of federal sovereignty in the formative period of the new state was very rare,
and there is substantial evidence that the principle was widely accepted by cantonal
authorities, despite their insistence on describing their cantons as ‘sovereign states’
(Goldstein, 2001: 99–140).
The change between the pre- and post-1848 constitutional order was not much more
dramatic in terms of policy-making competences conferred to the federal level
although, as explained below, these were explicitly spelled out in the constitution
and made subject to the procedure for constitutional revision. There was still no
single, standing federal army, no direct federal taxation and no unified civil and crim-
inal legal codes.16 The clearest innovations were in the field of the management of the
economy and citizenship rights. In the former, the constitution established a single
economic and monetary space with the federal authorities in charge of enforcing it.
All discrimination in inter-cantonal trade was abolished, the federal competence in
external trade confirmed and a single currency established. The constitution also
created Swiss citizenship, giving citizens the ability to exercise their rights throughout
the federation regardless of their canton of residence.17
The crucial difference from the previous constitutional order was arguably in the
institutional framework of the system. Whereas under the 1815 Federal Treaty the
only real confederal institution was the non-permanent Diet, the 1848 Constitution
set up an elaborated set of federal institutions – partially modelled on the US
system – with a bi-cameral Federal Assembly, a seven-member executive called the
Federal Council and a Federal Tribunal. The Federal Assembly was made up of a
directly elected lower chamber (the National Council) and an upper chamber of canto-
nal representatives (the Council of States) in which each canton was represented by two
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members, irrespective of its population.18 Each chamber had exactly the same power,
thus giving cantons strong influence in federal decision-making. Even more impor-
tantly, from the cantons’ point of view, was the fact that the granting of new
policy-making competences to the federal level would only be possible on the basis
of a constitutional revision, which was made dependent on an endorsement in a refer-
endum by a majority of the people and of the cantons.
Wide cantonal autonomy in policy-making, equal representation at the federal level,
perfect bicameralism and a cantonal majority for constitutional revisions thus rep-
resented a formidable set of guarantees to the cantons – especially to those on the
losing side of the 1847–48 confrontation – that the minority would not be trampled
on in the new federal state. Their position was later consolidated by the growing use
of direct democracy and proportional representation. This probably goes a long way
towards explaining the acceptance of the new order and the remarkable stability of
the modern Swiss political system. Despite two constitutional revisions, in 1874 and
1999, today’s institutional framework is still essentially the one set up in 1848.
The Evolution of Swiss Federalism Since 1848
If the 1848 settlement represented a delicate compromise between the desires of the
liberal and radical majority and the fears of the conservative minority, it could not
for long resist new pressures from both the liberal-radical movement and economic
necessity. As we have already seen, the new federal state was still extraordinarily
decentralized, with limited competences exercised at the central level. The pressures
that had led to the transformation of the confederation into a federal state were now
pushing in the direction of a greater centralization of the latter. The main drive was
the desire to harmonize regulations across cantons, especially weights and measures
and the legal codes, in order to facilitate economic activity on a country-wide basis.
After a failed attempt in 1872, a wide-ranging constitutional revision was approved
in 1874 giving more power to the central level, notably on matters of defence,
private law, transport and the environment.
As noted above, the 1874 revision left the institutional structure largely unchanged,
with the significant exception of a strengthening of the powers and independence of the
Federal Tribunal. In fact, the most significant innovation of the new constitution was
the introduction of an optional referendum for ordinary legislation, whereby 30,000
citizens could challenge any law passed by the Federal Assembly, adding to the man-
datory referendum for constitutional revisions. Even more important in this respect was
the introduction, in 1891, of the popular initiative for partial constitutional amend-
ments.19 These instruments became the pillars of the system of direct democracy
that has profoundly shaped the Swiss political system. In particular, as discussed in
more detail below, direct democracy has played a crucial role in constraining the cen-
tralizing tendency of the political dynamics and thus has preserved some of the peculiar
features of Swiss federalism.
This slow but persistent centralizing tendency was clearly displayed where the har-
monization of legal codes was concerned. An 1898 constitutional revision paved the
way for the adoption of a single civil code in 1907 and a single penal code in 1937.
After the First World War, and even more so after the Second World War, the same
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centralizing dynamic was on display in the progressive creation of a welfare state, with
more and more power conferred to the central level. This trend was reflected in the fact
that the 1874 constitution was amended more than 100 times over the course of the fol-
lowing century (Church, 2004: 35–47). Some of the most conservative cantons, such as
Uri, have consistently voted against all full, and most partial, revisions of the consti-
tution since 1848 but have nonetheless never questioned – after the very initial chal-
lenge – the legitimacy of the system. Interestingly, and probably not unrelated,
official nation-building after 1848 was centred on the ‘myths’ (such as the 1291 oath
and the William Tell legend) of the ‘primitive’ Switzerland of the so-called Forest
Cantons – the small, rural, conservative, Catholic cantons which fought and lost a
civil war to prevent a unified state from seeing the light of day.20
From before the establishment of the federal state until the 1970s, a slow but unam-
biguous process of centralization thus took place in the Swiss federal system. It was,
moreover, a process that gathered momentum over time, with a decline in the
number of defeats to constitutional amendments from the end of the nineteenth
century onwards (Aubert, 1974: 86). However, it is important to nuance this statement.
First, the Swiss federal state started from a situation of extreme decentralization more
commonly associated with confederations than with federations. The power shift that
has occurred over time can then partially be explained by the very low initial level of
centralization. Secondly, centralization has largely been confined to legislation while
policy implementation has been left to the cantons and the communes. Hence, for
example, while legal codes have been harmonized, the organization of the judicial
system is still in the hands of the cantons. Thirdly, centralization in the Swiss
system, though significant, has not gone as far as it has done in other federal states,
with the result that Switzerland is still the most decentralized of the main federations
(McKay, 2001: 142).
The process of centralization over time has been driven by three main forces: the
desire to facilitate economic activity by creating a single economic space governed
by harmonized regulation; the desire to grant citizens equality of rights in the political
and social spheres, which has translated into the strengthening of Swiss citizenship and
the building of a welfare state; and a strong nationalist ethos in the Radical Party. In
political terms, the forces driving this process forward were thus what could be
broadly defined as the ‘left’, which meant in the nineteenth century the liberal-
democratic movement embodied by the Radical Party, and in the twentieth century
the latter allied, to a certain extent, with the socialist movement. The forces resisting
it were essentially the conservative, Catholic party primarily rooted in German-
speaking, central Switzerland and the liberal free-market forces of French-speaking
Switzerland.
Beyond this fairly conventional positioning of the political forces on the issue of
relative distribution of power between the federal and the cantonal level, however, cen-
tralization has also been constrained in Switzerland by a number of factors more
peculiar to the Swiss political system and culture. The first and most obvious one is
the presence of strong cantonal identities rooted in history and normally associated
with linguistic and religious traits. Although these identities are subordinate to an
overall sense of Swiss nationhood, they make cantonal governments and, importantly,
their populations – who have the final say on constitutional amendments – wary of
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allowing policy-making competences to drift away to the federal institutions in Berne.
Secondly, centralization has been restrained by the quintessentially Swiss belief that
‘local’ is always preferable in principle to ‘distant’, and thus that policy-making
should be conducted, as much as practical, at the lowest possible level. It is in
essence the spirit of the much-debated principle of subsidiarity, even though the prin-
ciple was not explicitly spelled out in the Swiss constitution until 2004.21 The lowest
possible decision-making level in Switzerland is, of course, that of the people as embo-
died in the modern institutions of direct democracy and in the tradition of the Landsge-
meinde or popular citizen assemblies.22
This leads us to the last, but by no means least important, factor that has constrained
centralization in the Swiss federal system: the constitutional framework. Federal com-
petences must have an explicit constitutional basis, hence each new transfer of compe-
tence requires an amendment to the constitution. Furthermore, any such amendment
must pass the ultimate test of the mandatory referendum with double popular and
cantonal majorities. Many constitutional amendments have foundered in the face of
popular opposition. Taken together, these factors peculiar to the Swiss system have
posed a formidable obstacle to the process of centralization, and yet centralization
has still been significant. Relative centralization of legislation and regulation over
time and the maintenance of decentralized policy implementation has brought about
a wholesale blurring of the division of competences between the two levels of govern-
ment, thus undermining the original vision of the founding fathers of the federal state.
Contemporary Swiss Federalism
Two general points should be made about Swiss federalism. First, it is not a fixed entity
but an evolving affair marked by constitutional change and driven by political
dynamics. Secondly, its contemporary form and how it functions are not only
matters of institutional mechanics and of formal division of powers. They are also inti-
mately linked to political culture in a much more organic and behavioural way. More
generally, federalism is still vigorous both in its ‘institutional’ and ‘cultural’ forms and
remains very much at the heart of the Swiss political system. If anything, the 1999 Con-
stitution has reinforced it by, for example, making for the first time an explicit reference
to the role of the communes in Art. 50. It is also worth emphasizing that in Swiss pol-
itical discourse, federalism implies decentralization so that if someone says they are a
federalist, they mean pro-cantons and anti-Berne.23 This understanding of federalism
contrasts sharply with that prevailing in the British discourse on the EU, especially
in Eurosceptic quarters.
At heart, Swiss federalism is concerned with giving as much autonomy as possible
to local communities and letting the differences between them coexist peacefully and
harmoniously. Moreover, beyond the formal institutional arrangements, it is a way of
working and thinking, shaped by history and rooted in an organic, bottom-up con-
ception of the state. In such a context, informal institutions and procedures are as
(or more) prominent than formal ones. Swiss federalism has grown into a form of
cooperative federalism where there is a functional division of competences between
the federation and the cantons rather than a dualistic separation: legislation largely
produced centrally; implementation largely done regionally or locally.24 The principle
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of loyal co-operation between levels of government – the so-called Bundestreue
obligation – is central to its working and is reflected in the tax system which is also
divided both vertically and horizontally. Finally, it is important to point out that
because of its depth and width in Swiss society, federalism has become a key
component of Swiss national identity, which is based on ‘constitutional patriotism’
rather than, of course, on shared ethnicity or culture.25
This ‘mythical’ role probably also accounts for a certain anachronism in the official
terminology applied to Swiss federalism, with the state still officially called a confed-
eration and many cantons still describing themselves as independent, sovereign states.
The rest of this section explores these aspects by looking at actors, constitutional pro-
visions, formal and informal rules and procedures, and, finally, the problems and wider
applicability of Swiss federalism. It will conclude that Swiss federalism is more
complex and behaviourally determined than is commonly realized, partly because of
direct democracy, and that this raises questions about the extent to which the Swiss
experience is transferable.
Actors
There are three sets of institutional actor in Swiss federalism: the federation, the
cantons and the communes. All three levels of government have specific constitutional
tasks though their nature and extent naturally vary – and it is critical to include the
communes because they play an essential role in Switzerland.
The cantons still appear to be the central actors. Not only are they the crucial middle
level between the federation and the communes, they are also the building blocks of the
state. Constitutionally, they are the only actors free to determine their own policy-
making role within the limits of the federal constitution although, de facto, this
freedom has been progressively reduced by the process of centralization discussed
above. Moreover, as already mentioned, they are the main agencies of public policy
implementation in the country and thus the principal ‘face’ of the political system
vis-a`-vis the citizens.
The 26 cantons and half-cantons vary greatly in size, both geographically and demo-
graphically, in their political influence and in the length of time they have been in the
Swiss (con-)federation but, nonetheless, they all have the same rights under the federal
constitution.26 So-called half-cantons, the result of splits of whole cantons at critical
historical junctures, are almost de facto full cantons and have the same rights save
for having just one seat, rather than two, in the Council of States and half the weight
in calculating the cantonal majority in constitutional referendums; the 1999 Consti-
tution further plays down the distinction between full and half cantons. Cantons, as
already observed, still tend to perceive themselves, at least in their official discourse,
as independent and sovereign. Indeed, they do retain vestigial elements of statehood
including a concept of cantonal demos and citizenship, full taxation power and a
‘residual powers’ clause. They are probably more autonomous, more organic and
more ‘self-conscious’ than regional units in other federal systems.27 Partly because
of their historical independence and ‘precedence’ vis-a`-vis the federal state, cantons
are also more inclined to act as individual units rather than as a collective ‘cantonal
lobby’. Historically, the cantons have preferred to retain their policy-making autonomy
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rather than to cede it to the central level in exchange for a significant stake in federal
decision-making, although, in some areas, they have inevitably been forced to do
so and are now fully integrated into federal decision-making. Not only are they
represented in one chamber of the bi-cameral Federal Assembly, they are also
fully involved in pre-parliamentary consultations on draft legislation, a crucial
agenda-setting phase in the Swiss law-making process (Church, 2004: 163–86).
The federation is, nevertheless, a very important actor, although, strictly speaking,
its status is ambiguous. At some points, the federal constitution implies that the ‘Con-
federation’ – i.e. the federation – is synonymous with the whole Swiss political
system, including cantons and communes. Elsewhere, it refers to the ‘Confederation’
as the federal level of government – essentially the federal institutions – as distinct
from, if not sometimes opposed to, the cantons and the communes. While bearing in
mind the tension between the two conceptualizations, we use the latter conceptualiz-
ation not least because one key component of the ‘Confederation’, both in the
formal language of the constitution and, in a very real sense, through direct democracy,
is the Swiss people, who cannot be neatly subsumed into the federal institutions.28
Communes are also important actors in the system. There are several types of
commune, but the one we are concerned with here is the so-called ‘political
commune’, comparable to those in Germany, France and Italy (it does not have an
exact equivalent in English local government) (Church, 2004: 92–102). The nearly
3000 communes carry out a great deal of policy implementation, directly raise a sig-
nificant amount of taxation to finance it and, importantly, are the agencies granting citi-
zenship. Uniquely among federal states, Swiss citizenship depends on cantonal
citizenship which in turn depends on citizenship of a commune.29 It is tempting to
see communes as miniature cantons, and there are certainly many similarities
between the two. However, it is worth pointing out that cantons are not themselves
‘federal’ so do not accord communes the status the federation accords to them. None-
theless, many cantons make explicit reference to the communes in their constitutions
and treat them with a great deal of respect, unlike the cavalier way local government
is treated in some other political systems. The 1999 constitution also gives formal rec-
ognition to communes and requires the federal institutions to take them into account
when formulating public policy.
Division of Competences
The division of competences between the three levels of government is primarily regu-
lated through constitutional norms: federal norms regulate the relationship between the
federation and the cantons, and cantonal norms regulate the relationship between
canton and communes. The new constitution adopted in 1999 ushered in some slight
changes. As these new rules have been in operation for such a short time, it is not poss-
ible to evaluate their impact fully. The presence of constitutional rules at both federal
and cantonal level means that each of the three levels operates within legal constraints
and has to respect the autonomy and prerogatives of the other levels and to cooperate
with them. This said, there is a clear hierarchy of levels. Cantonal constitutions and
legislation constrain the communes’ margin of manoeuvre while the federal consti-
tution and laws prevail over cantonal laws. Importantly, cantonal acts are subject to
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judicial review by the Federal Tribunal while federal acts are not and can only be chal-
lenged through referendum.
The formal division of competences is less clear-cut than might be expected: it is not
fully specified and it operates through several categories – fully cantonal, joint, and
fully federal – which are not straightforward. The complexity arises from the fact
that the joint competences are shared between the two levels in a variety of different
ways and that even within fully federal competences policy implementation is typically
left to cantons and communes. In other words, the division of competences relates
essentially to the legislative sphere, while policy implementation is overwhelmingly
carried out at lower levels. (Appendix 1 gives a more detailed picture of the division.)
By and large, this pattern is mirrored in the fiscal sphere. All three levels have
revenue-raising powers and broadly speaking aim to be self-financing although there
is a considerable degree of revenue sharing. Reflecting the distribution of policy
implementation, cantons and communes spend more than the federation; indeed, the
federation has been granted tax income on a limited temporal basis only and cannot
extend it unilaterally. Although not dependent on income from the centre, cantons
do get help from the federation through sharing in federal taxes plus by receiving
grants, refunds and subsidies in compensation for their implementation role and/or
investment. This is done through an equalization fund intended to smooth the imbal-
ances in revenues among cantons. However, significant differences persist and the
overall financial impact of equalization is much weaker than in other federal
systems, such as Germany. It is, however, comparable to the EU structural funds in
relation to GDP (McKay, 2001: 115). There is an ongoing debate on how to streamline
the equalization system notably on the possibility of turning it into a purely horizontal
system of transfers between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ cantons, by-passing the federal level
(Church, 2004: 92–102).
Institutions and Formal Procedures
The three levels – and especially the cantons and the federation – are woven together
in a cooperative way by a variety of means, including:
. Constitutional amendments: cantons have collective veto power over any shift of
competences to the federal level because all amendments to the federal constitution
are subject to approval by a majority of cantons, as well as of the people, in a man-
datory referendum. It does happen that popular and cantonal majorities do not
coincide and thus that amendments are not passed; eight such occasions have
occurred since 1848 (Church, 2004: 143–53).
. Political representation: theoretically this takes place via the Council of States,
which, as mentioned above, has equal power with the National Council. With the
shift to direct elections, members are now elected on party lines and owe greater
loyalty to their party than to their canton. However, cantons also serve as constitu-
encies for elections to the National Council so the cantonal basis of representation
remains strong.30 The role of representation of the cantons is to a certain extent per-
formed by the intergovernmental conferences of cantonal ministers and cantonal
presidents, which are the collective voice of the cantons. There is no cantonal
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representation as such in the seven-member Federal Council (the federal executive),
but unwritten proportionality rules stipulate that not more than one councillor should
come from the same canton and that the college should contain at least two
non-German speakers and both Protestants and Catholics.31
. Decision and policy-making: cantons share in this via the Council of States, their
constitutionally guaranteed role in the process of pre-parliamentary consultation,
by representation in federal bodies such as the Integration Bureau32 and via
federal-cantonal conferences. Under Art. 141 of the federal constitution a request
by eight cantons can also trigger a referendum challenge to any federal law.33
Cantons are thus fully involved in the three key phases of federal law-making in
Switzerland: pre-parliamentary, parliamentary and post-parliamentary.
. Implementation: as already mentioned, cantons and communes undertake most of
the financing and implementation of federal laws and policies: there is no local
federal administration such as that which exists in the US. There is also a great
deal of inter-cantonal cooperation, through conferences of ministers and signing
of ‘treaties’, known as concordats, on a range of matters that cantons want to
retain as their exclusive competence but on which some degree of harmonization
is also deemed desirable. A prominent example of this is horizontal cooperation
in education among the francophone cantons.34
. Judicial: cantonal courts provide the lower level of the judicial system. Legal codes
have now been harmonized at the federal level although the organization of the judi-
cial system is still left to the cantons, with significant differences existing between
them. Apart from the Federal Tribunal and its specialist sections, there is no
overall federal judicial system. The Federal Tribunal ensures uniform application
of federal law and compliance of cantonal acts with it. However, as it is not a con-
stitutional court, it does not have the power to strike down federal acts on the
grounds of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the ‘guaranteeing’ of cantonal
constitutions’ conformity with the federal constitution is performed by the Federal
Parliament not by the Tribunal.
Informal Behaviour and Politics
Informal behaviour and political culture broadly understood are important to Swiss fed-
eralism. All Swiss institutions such as parties, trade unions, business associations or
voluntary associations are organized in a federal way, bringing together cantonal
and other decentralized branches. This depth and spread of federalism as an organizing
principle of political life emerges from shared historical experiences and identities and
feeds into a political culture which very much values autonomy and bottom-up sol-
utions. The Swiss tend to express this as ‘feeling federal’. The way federalism
totally pervades Swiss political life is very much in evidence in the democratic
process itself, be it through the representative institutions or through direct democracy.
Parties that operate at the federal level are federations of cantonal parties rather than
centralized organizations; hence they usually have a significant degree of internal
political differences. The split in the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) between
the traditionally conservative Bernese wing and the much more radical Zurich
wing is the most emblematic example (Kriesi, 2001). There are also subtle and
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not-so-subtle linkages between cantonal and federal elections with the former –
especially in key cantons – often interpreted as bellwethers for the latter.
Federalism is also prominent where direct democracy is concerned. Referendums
and initiatives were historically introduced in cantons from the 1830s onwards
before being adopted by the federation. They are still more widely used and their
impact on the system is deeper at cantonal and communal level than at the federal
level. All cantons have a right of legislative initiative and, unlike the federation,
many use the financial referendum on important items of public expenditure (Kriesi,
1998: 90–98). Much the same goes for the communal level. Thus, the greater part
of citizen participation in decision-making in Switzerland – through direct
democracy – takes place at the cantonal and communal levels rather than at the
federal level. It is also worth stressing that the cumulative impact of direct democracy
across the three levels is huge and makes the Swiss system extraordinarily open to
citizens’ input.
Problems
All this may seem to suggest that the system is wonderful and faultless; it is indeed often
highly praised. But, althoughmost people would agree that, generally speaking, it works
well, there are problems. It is subject to strong centripetal forces which suggest that
some of its outcomes are not optimal. A list of the most prominent issues would include:
. Territorial: most of the cantons, and especially the half-cantons, are very small
by the standards of European regions, some of them extremely so. Appenzell-
Inner-Rhoden, to cite the most obvious example, has an area of 172 square km
and a population of 14,500. Due to their limited size, and often irregular borders,
these small cantons are simply not effective as ‘functional’ administrative units.
There has been a movement towards using larger ‘group of cantons’ units for
statistical purposes, but any suggestion of mergers of cantons is extremely sensitive.
Attempts to reunify the two halves of canton Basle and to merge Geneva with Vaud
foundered after lengthy negotiations and amid public hostility. Needless to say, what
makes the cantons what they are is their historical identities as distinctive ‘patries’
rather than administrative rationale, so any attempt to restructure the cantonal level
of government by appealing to the latter tends to be a political non-starter.
. Transparency: the blurring over time of the division of competences and of respon-
sibilities makes the process of decision-making rather opaque. A recent attempt to
disentangle it has had only limited success (Church, 2004: 154–62). This reinforces
the fact that devising a rational and effective ‘division of labour’ between the differ-
ent levels of government and, a fortiori, an efficient system of ‘fiscal federalism’ is
far from easy.35 The current system of financial equalization is very difficult to
understand and is hard to reform given the vested interests at play and the tendency
by each level of government to offload onerous tasks onto another. Tax competition
among cantons is also a delicate issue, difficult to tackle without some form of fiscal
harmonization which would, of course, impinge on fiscal autonomy of the cantons.
. Language: in the past federalism was an effective way of allowing different
communities to live in relative isolation, thereby reducing friction. It is less able
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to do so now as the media tend to reinforce the boundaries between linguistic
communities – which, with the partial exception of Ticino,36 do not coincide with
cantonal borders – and no political structure corresponds to the linguistic
communities.37 Although the linguistic cleavage is not directly politicized, it
looms large on several key issues, including European integration.
. Status: though conservatives defend federalism as a fundamental part of Swiss
identity, generally speaking it is not as popular as it used to be. Support has fallen
from 60 to 40 per cent over the last ten years as criticism of some of its aspects
has grown (Church, 2004: 154–62). The breaching of the informal rule that no
more than one member of the Federal Council should come from a single canton
that arose following the 2003 election, when two Councillors from Zurich were
chosen, suggests that ‘federal’ considerations had been swept aside by partisan
Realpolitik.
. Conservative bias: the system tends to be seen, at least from a left-wing point of
view, as having a conservative bias. By empowering the rural, conservative
cantons of primordial Switzerland (Urschweiz) and/or contrarians (Neinsager) it
blocks progressive legislation and encourages social inequality.
. Tasks: Swiss federalism can lead to public policy tasks being tackled at the
wrong level. This can be dramatically exposed in times of emergency such as the
Schweizerhalle disaster when major pollution of the Rhine had to be dealt with by
canton Basle-City, which clearly lacked the resources to do it. The problems
canton Geneva faced in policing the anti-G8 demonstrations in 2003 is another
example.
Lessons for the EU
What can the EU learn from the Swiss experience? Three areas of the debate on the
European Union are relevant here. First, how to conceptualize the nature of the EU
system and what role states and citizens play within it, especially in relation to the
states’ desire to retain their sovereignty and the fragility of popular identification
with Europe. Secondly, how to divide policy competences between the Union and
the states so as to maximize the policy-making capacity of the system. Thirdly, how
to improve its democratic quality, i.e. its responsiveness to the citizens both in terms
of inputs and of accountability.
But which Switzerland should we look to as a model? To the contemporary system
or to the last confederation? Given the nature of today’s EU and the pattern of
collective identities in Europe, the 1815–48 confederation is probably a closer
model than today’s federal state, but it is worth bearing in mind the factors that led
to the end of the confederation and those that shaped the evolution of the post-1848
federal state.
The Nature of the EU Political System
Analysis of the Swiss political system before and after 1848 compared to that of the
EU provides strong support for conceptualizing the EU as a confederation. Yet,
although such descriptions have long been discussed, they are still not widely used,
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with many scholars preferring formulas such as ‘quasi-federal’ and sui generis. 38 Con-
ceptualizing the EU as a confederation opens up the possibility of analysing the EU in a
comparative way, rather than treating it as an entirely unprecedented form of political
system. There is one problem, however: all the main historical examples of confedera-
tion existed in the distant past; no confederation truly comparable to the EU exists
today. We thus propose an analytical ‘double act’ of comparing a contemporary con-
federation of states – the EU –with a historical confederation of states – in this case
Switzerland 1815–48 – and with a contemporary federal state – such as today’s
Switzerland. When comparing the EU to a historical confederation, we have to
assess the incentives and constraints the system faced in the first half of the nineteenth
century with the incentives and constraints generated by the modern world, although it
does appear that the key element of the member states’ desire to retain their sovereignty
is relatively constant. When comparing the Union with a contemporary federal state,
we need to take into account that in today’s EU ultimate sovereignty – both in
terms of its popular locus and of the institutions entrusted with exercising it in the
name of the people – rests with the states rather with the Union, as does citizens’
primary collective identification.
A powerful centralizing trend – from confederation to federation and from a less
centralized to a more centralized federation – can be detected in the evolution of
the Swiss system. This can probably be explained by the fact that federal states are
unquestionably more coherent frameworks for economic activity and more efficient
decision-makers than confederations of states as well as being, potentially, more demo-
cratic.39 The EU has faced and is still facing similar pressures towards more efficiency
and more democracy so we should expect pressure for greater centralization to
continue there as well.
However, the Swiss experience also indicates that the transition from a confederal to a
federal order may take a very long period of time and may have to go through a phase of
conflict to be finally accomplished. Despite the fact that the Swiss confederation became
progressively tighter over time, the final transition to a federal state took place only after
a civil war.40 Like nineteenth century Switzerland, turning the EU into a federal state
would imply the explicit voluntary renunciation of sovereignty by the states, going
beyond the current arrangement of ‘pooled’ sovereignty.41 This appears highly unlikely
for the foreseeable future and suggests that the EU is likely to continue to integrate along
incremental lines avoiding a ‘big-bang’ transition to a federal state, which could only be
achieved through conflict. The way the Constitutional Treaty has been negotiated and
will likely be ratified – increasingly dropping the federal elements and emphasizing
the confederal ones – appears to confirm this interpretation.
A final point worth emphasizing in relation to the nature of the EU political system is
that institutional evolution in nineteenth century Switzerland went hand in hand with
change in collective identities. A federal state was eventually accepted only because
a sense of Swiss nationhood was already there. However, once in place the federal
state, in turn, embarked on official nation-building. It is difficult to ascertain the direc-
tion of causality between institution-building and collective identities – for example
the Helvetic Republic failed institutionally but probably had a deep impact on identi-
ties – but it seems clear that the institutional evolution of the EU system should also be
matched by identity-building or it will risk losing further legitimacy, even if it remains
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within the confines of a confederal order. A fortiori, of course, the emergence of a
‘thicker’ identification with Europe at mass public level could be the conditio sine
qua non for a legitimate transformation of the EU into a federal state.42 So far there
has been little sign of this happening.
The Allocation of Competences
On the issue of the division of competences, there are more differences than similarities
in the way policy-making responsibilities are allocated. These differences are of two
kinds: legal-constitutional and substantive. As regards the former, the EU competences
rest on a principle of explicit conferral by the states while in Switzerland the federal
and cantonal competences are defined by the same federal constitution. In this, as in
many other respects, the contrast between the EU’s confederal nature and the
‘organic’, federal nature of Switzerland is sharply visible. On the other hand, the prin-
ciple of the supremacy of Union law over state law mirrors that of federal law over can-
tonal law and is formally recognized in Art. 10 of the Constitutional Treaty as it is in
Art. 49 of the Swiss constitution. Much the same goes for the principle of subsidiarity
which informs the distribution of power in both systems under Art. 9(3) of the Consti-
tutional43 Treaty and the new Art. 5a of the Swiss Constitution respectively.
Substantively, the allocation of competences appears similar in the two systems, but
crucial differences are evident.44 The systems are closest in the area of monetary and
fiscal policies whereby the former is dealt with at the central level and the latter is
largely in the hands of the states and the cantons. As already observed, the degree of
territorial re-distribution is also broadly similar. Greater divergence is present in the
broad areas of transport and communication which are, by and large, run at the
federal level in Switzerland but are primarily in the hands of the states in the EU.
The largest discrepancy is, not surprisingly, in the area of foreign policy and
defence. These are exclusive competences of the federal authorities in Switzerland,
whereas they remain overwhelmingly controlled by the states in the EU (despite the
provisions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy). The reforms contained in
the Constitutional Treaty, including the provision of a ‘double-hatted’ Foreign Minister
will not significantly alter the current situation. Once again, the nature of the EU as a
primarily economic confederation contrasts sharply with that of today’s Switzerland as
a sovereign federal state.
As regards the vexed question of the ‘ideal’ distribution of competences in the EU,
the Swiss experience indicates that this is a politically charged question and that it is
virtually impossible to identify a ‘perfect’ distribution of competences in a neutral,
‘technocratic’ way. The ongoing debate in the EU on issues such as tax harmonization,
as reflected in the deliberations of the Convention and elsewhere, confirms this
interpretation.
Recalling the observation made above on the trend towards centralization in both
Switzerland and the EU, the last point worth emphasizing is that the single most
important check on centralization in the Swiss system has been the constitutional fra-
mework – in particular, the provision for mandatory referendums requiring both
popular and cantonal majorities. Nonetheless, policy competences are significantly
more centralized under the 1999 Constitution than they were under the 1874
The Dynamics of Confederalism and Federalism 179
Constitution, let alone that of 1848. This suggests that for curbing centralization, mech-
anisms for transferring competences are more important than the initial distribution.
Constitutions are adopted at specific points in time and have to adapt to change.
How they do this is crucial. In light of the above, the EU should pay as much as –
if not more – attention to such mechanisms than to the starting point. Moreover, it
should be borne in mind that although ‘constitutional’ amendments require unanimity
among the states in the EU, as opposed to a majority of the cantons in Switzerland, the
absence of mandatory referendums in all states probably means that constitutional safe-
guards against centralization are currently weaker in the EU than in Switzerland.45 The
decisions of several states to hold non-mandatory referendums to ratify the Consti-
tutional Treaty may mark a shift away from this.
Quality of Democracy
As already observed, a federal constitutional order is potentially more democratic than
a confederal one, and Swiss history provides ample evidence for this assertion.
However, Swiss history also provides evidence that a federal order is hardly sustainable
in the absence of sufficiently strong citizen identification with the federal polity as a
whole rather than primarily with one of its components. Moreover, the Swiss experi-
ence, especially between 1798 and 1848, also casts serious doubt over whether the
‘constitutional patriotism’ hypothesis – i.e. that identification follows institutions,
rather than the other way round – can work in practice, however appealing it may
sound in theory.
Closely linked to the issues of democracy and accountability is the precise form of
cooperation between the central level and the state/cantonal level in the two systems.
Swiss federalism largely conforms to the model of cooperative federalism, whereby
legislation is enacted at the central level and implementation is carried out by regional
or local levels. The EU also displays many features of cooperative federalism. This
form of federalism has led in Switzerland to a blurring of the responsibilities and
accountability of the political system vis-a`-vis the citizens. Responsibilities and
accountability are already opaque in the EU, so a deepening of the cooperative
nature of the system is unlikely to improve things. A more ‘dualistic’ form of (con)fed-
eralism would be better adapted to the EU system and to European-wide political
culture but would likely clash with the states’ desire to keep power at the Union
level to a minimum (Abromeit, 2002).
Finally, we cannot fully understand Swiss federalism, or indeed the system as a
whole, without taking into account the role of direct democracy. The question of
whether instruments of direct democracy could be used on an EU-wide basis is an
extremely delicate and difficult one, which goes well beyond the scope of this
article.46 Direct democracy, in various forms, has deep roots in Swiss political
culture and had operated for a significant length of time at cantonal level before
being adopted at the federal level; neither of these elements apply in the EU context.
The Constitutional Treaty has made a step in the direction of direct democracy,
however, by providing for a ‘citizens’ initiative’ – as detailed in Art. 46, paragraph
4 – but this will not be an instrument of, strictly speaking, direct democracy
because it will not lead to an EU-wide popular vote.
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Conclusions
Switzerland is an extremely interesting example of a con/federal system in both its
historical and contemporary dimensions. It can be seen as the near perfect embo-
diment of the federal idea. But it is also a peculiar and idiosyncratic political
system, in which formal institutions and cultural patterns are closely intertwined.
As such it is a fascinating political system to study but also a very difficult one to
imitate.47 Moreover, recent political developments have moved the country
further away from the EU and probably made the latter less willing to see Switzerland
as a ‘model’.48 Nonetheless, there are striking similarities between Switzerland – as a
confederation and as a federation – and the European Union, both at the societal level
and at the institutional level. At the societal level, Switzerland is in many respects a
microcosm of Europe though, of course, the degree of ‘diversity’ is far greater in the
EU than in Switzerland. As far as institutions are concerned, today’s EU can be con-
ceptualized as a still predominantly economic confederation facing strong and conflict-
ing pressures – to become, and to keep from becoming, both more ‘political’ and more
‘federal’.
As Switzerland has experienced a long confederal history and undergone a transition
to a federal state, its experience could be of deep relevance for the contemporary debate
on the EU. This article has sought to outline to what extent we can learn from one
experience in order to shape the other. In conclusion we would argue that the Consti-
tutional Treaty should be seen as more of a consolidation and simplification of the
existing EU’s confederal order than the starting point for a transition to a federal
state. The division of competences between the Union and the states is likewise clari-
fied but not radically altered and many key policy areas normally dealt with at the
central level in federal states such as Switzerland remain under states’ control.
Though this outcome may disappoint federalists, it should not surprise anyone, not
least in the light of Switzerland’s experience.
Notes
11 August 1291 is the date on which the swearing of a solemn oath between the three initial cantons of
the Swiss Confederation is traditionally believed to have taken place.
2See, among others, Muret (1950).
3The country may still officially call itself a ‘confederation’ in Latin, French and Italian – though,
importantly, not in German in which it is referred to as Eidgenossenschaft (oath fellowship) – but
it is undoubtedly a federal state.
4The Helvetic Republic, imposed after the French invasion and based on the 1798 constitution, lasted
until 1802. The 1803 Federal Constitution, better known as the Act of Mediation, set up a halfway
system between a confederation and a federation, with France retaining ultimate authority. This
lasted until 1815; see Aubert (1974: 8–16). On the Swiss executive being modelled on that of the
Directorial regime in France 1795–97, see Kriesi (1998: 218–19).
5There is some disagreement among scholars on whether direct democracy should be considered a
modern or a long-standing feature of the Swiss political system. On the one hand, the contemporary
instruments of direct democracy were introduced relatively recently (late nineteenth century as far
as the federal level is concerned). On the other hand, many cantons do have very long traditions of
popular decision-making symbolized by the institution of the Landsgemeinde (open-air popular
assembly) and, in certain cases, of referring decisions back to communes ad referendum.
6This point is elaborated below.
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7Twenty-two from 1833 when canton Basle split into two half-cantons, see below.
8European law requires that state constitutions be in conformity with its principles – e.g. the right
to vote in local and European elections for EU citizens – but it has no formal power over domestic
constitutions as such and offers them no guarantees.
9The latter varied from 1,184 francs from canton Uri to 91,695 francs from canton Berne at the time of
the signing of the Federal Treaty, see Ko¨lz (1992–96: 194).
10As far as the cantonal level is concerned the modern form of direct democracy dates from this
period.
11On the circumstances of the secession see Church (1983: 57–69).
12The country also narrowly escaped intervention by Austria and France, in support of the Sonderbund
alliance and the liberal cantons, respectively; see Lister (2001: 114–16).
13This only appeared in the revised constitution of 1874.
14Ultimately, this meant they had lost their sovereignty. There is a tendency in political science
scholarship to use the term sovereignty in a loose way to mean policy-making autonomy rather
than in its legal sense of ultimate, supreme power. On the cantons being no longer sovereign,
see Aubert (1974: 29–30; 81). Incidentally, the supremacy of the federal constitution over the
cantonal constitutions also meant that under Art. 6b the latter had to have a republican nature.
This could have been a problem for canton Neuchaˆtel, long a Prussian principality, had it not
had its own republican revolution in 1848, see Aubert (1974: 33–4) and Luck (1985: 309–14). See
also Art. 28 of the German constitution and Art. IV, section 4 of the US constitution for similar
provisions.
15On the status of half-cantons, see Hughes (1970 [1954]: 3–4).
16Which are, of course, crucially important in a civil law system such as Switzerland.
17Interestingly, Swiss citizenship remained dependent on cantonal citizenship in a very similar manner
to the way in which EU citizenship is dependent on state citizenship. Art. 42 stated: ‘Everyone who is a
citizen of a canton is a Swiss citizen.’ Incidentally, the same article also forbade the exercise of political
rights in more than one canton, unlike in today’s EU where this is sometimes possible, e.g. an Italian
citizen resident in the UK can vote for all elections and referendums in Italy as well as for local and
European elections in the UK.
18These representatives, however, were no longer delegates of cantonal governments but were selected
by cantonal parliaments. They are now directly elected.
19This allowed citizens to propose changes to individual articles of the constitution.
20The Swiss national day, 1 August, commemorates the 1291 pact rather than any date related to the
foundation of the federal state. It was first celebrated in 1891; the William Tell monument in
Altdorf, Uri was erected in 1895.
21It is often stated that ‘residual powers’ clauses such as those of Art. 3 of the Swiss constitution, Art. 30
of the German constitution, the 10th amendment to the US constitution etc. represent a formulation of
the principle of subsidiarity. However, this is incorrect as they only state a presumption in favour
of the cantons, La¨nder and states vis-a`-vis the federal level but not a general presumption in favour
of the lowest level of government which, in all these cases, would be the commune or municipality;
see Art. 1 of the EU Treaty and Art. 5a of the Swiss Constitution introduced in 2004.
22For an enthusiastic, journalistic account of the Swiss belief in the wisdom of the people, see Føssedal
(2002). Only two cantonal, Landsgemeinden survive (in Appenzell-Inner-Rhoden and Glarus) other
cantons having abolished theirs.
23This is similar to the case in the United States, where ‘federalism’ is often linked to the idea of states’
rights.
24For more on cooperative federalism, see Bo¨rzel’s article in this volume.
25It could be argued that such belief in the political values of Switzerland and pride in its institutions
constitute a cultural element shared by all Swiss, see Church (2004).
26In official Swiss usage, cantons are listed in descending order by the date they joined the confederation/
federation, save for the three ‘managing cantons’ under the 1815–48 Confederation, which are listed
first.
27We prefer the term ‘region’ to that of ‘state’ when referring to sub-central units of a federal system –
which take different names in different countries e.g. cantons, La¨nder, provinces, states and indeed
regions – as it avoids the conceptual confusion generated by the fact that the federal state itself is
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a ‘state’. As Aubert (1974: 81) put it: ‘L’Etat fe´de´ral ou fe´de´ratif (Bundesstaat) est un Etat souverain,
compose´ d’Etats qui ont cesse´ de l’eˆtre’.
28There is arguably a similar tension in the European discourse between the conceptualization of the EU
as the whole political system including states, regions etc. and identifying it with ‘Brussels’.
29The ruling by the Federal Tribunal in mid-2003 that communes could not use direct democracy to
decide on individual applications for naturalization caused anger in conservative circles.
30It could be argued that the only real difference between the National Council and the Council of States
is in the lower ‘district magnitude’ of the latter, which favours the centrist parties and under-represents
left- and right-wing factions.
31Before 1999, Art. 96 of the 1874 constitution formally prevented any two councillors coming from the
same canton from being elected, see Hughes (1970 [1954]: 107–8). The rule was broken in the 2003
elections, when two councillors from Zurich, the largest and most powerful canton, were elected.
32A federal body charged with coordination of European integration policy.
33This happened for the first time in 2003–4 when a large group of cantons decided to challenge the
Federal Council’s proposed financial reforms and won.
34See Hega (2000). Inter-cantonal cooperation in Switzerland can be seen as the functional equivalent of
what in the EU is now called the ‘open method of co-ordination’.
35The experiences of other federal states provide ample demonstration of this difficulty. See, among
others, McKay (2001: Chapter 8).
36Save for small Italian-speaking communities in Graubu¨nden, Ticino de facto coincides with Italian-
speaking Switzerland.
37For a discussion of the linguistic communities in Belgium, see Swenden in this volume.
38See, among others, Taylor (1975), Wallace (1982) and, especially, Forsyth (1981). See also Warleigh
(1998) for a recent plea in favour of the same approach.
39Provided that there is a sufficient sense in the population of being a demos. So-called ‘sovereignists’
would, of course, contest this.
40It could be argued that the US too became a real federal state only after the 1861–65 civil war. See,
among others, Goldstein (2001: esp. 22–33).
41Incidentally, in light of the Swiss, German and US constitutions mentioned above, an EU federal state
with a republican order – say, a Federal Republic of Europe – would probably imply the abandonment
of the monarchical order by its component states, such as the UK, as the latter would conflict with the
republican principles set in the federal constitution.
42See Zimmer (2003: 85–118) and Lister (2001: 116–17) for discussions of this point in relation to Swit-
zerland; and Forsyth (1981: 187) and McKay (2001: 145–50) in relation to the EU.
43The principle of subsidiarity was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty.
44See Dubey (2002) for a very detailed comparative analysis of the allocation of competences in
Switzerland, and in the EU (prior to the Nice Treaty).
45See also McKay (2001: 147–9) on this point.
46For recent attempts to tackle this question, see Abromeit (1998), Hug (2002) and Papadopoulos (2002).
47See Steinberg (1988) for a general discussion.
48The 2003 elections for parliament and the executive were a triumph for the right-wing Swiss People’s
Party, which is strongly opposed to EU membership. Although the country’s application has not been
formally withdrawn, the chances of it being ‘activated’ have further receded. Moreover, the tradition-
ally more ‘pro-EU’ French-speaking part of the country also appears to have cooled considerably on the
issue.
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Appendix 1
Division of Competences under the 1999 Federal Constitution
Cantonal Joint Federal
Fully Shared
Culture (Article 69) Agriculture (104) Foreign Policy (54 &184)
Policing (52) Energy (89) Army & Defence (58–60)
Youth & Sport (68) Internal Security (57) Customs (101)
Education (70) Sustainable Development (73) Alpine Traffic (84)
Church/State
Relations (72)
Economic Life (94) Provisioning (102)
Cultural & National
Heritage (78)
Taxation (128) Foreigners (121)
Culture (Article 69)
Water Resources (76) Naturalization (38)
Civil & Criminal Law (122–3) Swiss Abroad (40)
Political Rights (39) Armaments (107)
Social Security (41) Rail & Air Travel (87)






Land use planning (75)
Nuclear Power (90)
Health & Health Insurance (118)
Competition (96)













Voc. Education (63 & 67)
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